Checking through my archives, I came across these two articles and thought they may be interesting to put on the blog.
I am still reading it at the moment, but Clinton Fernandes, author of Reluctant Saviour has just published a new book, Reluctant Indonesians on West Papua.
Click on "more" below to read the articles.
Of course, a lot has happened in Aceh since the first article was written. The Free Aceh Movement has come to an agreement with the current Indonesian government, giving up the demand for independence and accepting a negotiated level of autonomy for the province of Aceh within the Republic of Indonesia. This appears to be an accommodation by the Acehnese business and social elite with the rest of the Indonesian business and social elite based on opportunities being opened for them.
In Papua, there appears to be a range of political activity taking place around campaigns against violations of human rights; elections to positions of governor and bupati; campaigns around allocation of government funds; the issue of the division of West Papua into two provinces; the closure of the Freeport mine; rejection versus support of new Special Autonomy laws and several others. The real integration of West Papua into Indonesia took place during the period of dictatorship (1965-98). The lack of democratic rights during this period meant that this process denied the population of West Papua any semblance of participating in the process in a way that would satisfy a desire to determine their own future. Since the fall of the dictatorship there is more political space for political organisation and mobilisation, despite the lingering presence of the old repressive apparatus, mainly the military. How dissatisfaction around both political issues (democracy/self-determination/discriminatuion issues) as well as socio-economic grievances are manifesting themselves in politics in all of the towns and villages of Papuas is not clear to me. The lack of a wide range of media publications in Papua makes it difficult to develop a clear picture of what is happening on the ground for the distant, non-fulltime observer. I am slowly collecting information and may get to write on this at a later date. A part of the initial picture is that there is an effort now by the social, political and business elite working out of Jakarta to inegrate the local elites in West Papua into a national elite. Thet are trying to work out an accommodation. The consequences for the 1 million melanesians who are not part of the elite? And for the almost 1 million non-Melanesian urban poor?
INDONESIA: When `national unity' is no longer voluntary
BY MAX LANE This article appeared in June 11 Jakarta Post, 2002
JAKARTA — The persistence of the movement for a self-determination referendum in Aceh, the emergence of the Papuan People's Council and the troubles in Ambon have all raised concerns about whether Indonesian unity can be maintained.
Indonesia's process of achieving national unity during the first six decades, and especially the first four decades, of the 20th century is somewhat unique. There are indeed very few countries where the national unification of a multi-ethnic territory has occurred without war.
Of course, the territorial boundaries and basic economic structure — taxes, treasury, customs, a single currency — were created by the Dutch colonialists. But the fundamental components of a national language, a national culture and a common perspective for an independent Indonesia were created in the face of extreme hostility from the Dutch authorities.
Dutch policy fostered local tradition over any new national political or general Indonesian culture. Dutch policy suppressed the main instruments of national unification: the political movements and political parties. Finally, when the Dutch realised in 1949 that independence was inevitable, they insisted on a federal structure and tried to carry out a divide and rule policy.
A unitary state, reflecting a process aimed at the creation of a single Indonesian nation, was voluntarily accepted by the vast majority within the independence movement.
Maintaining the voluntary character of the struggle to establish an Indonesian state, build a single Indonesian nation and all the associated political institutions meant one thing: democracy.
Democracy was Sukarno's reply to Muslims who called for an Islamic state. He called on them to win majority support. Relations between the centre and provinces also required open and democratic processes, reflected in the open competition between political parties for influence in the provinces as well as in the national parliament.
Repression
The emergence of self-determination movements in Aceh and West Papua have been caused by the escalating violation of the principles of democracy and voluntary unity since the 1950s, but most particularly during the repressive years of General Suharto's New Order regime. Any violation of the original voluntary character destroys the original basis of unity.
In West Papua, the 1962 Act of Free Choice was a manipulation which completely violated the principle of voluntary unity. In Aceh, the period of military operations in the 1980s, reactivated in a new form today, also completely broke the principle of voluntary unity. The early calls for independence were not answered in the way that Sukarno or other nationalist leaders would have answered such calls.
They would have answered with arguments and visions for a democratic future for Indonesia. All the early nationalist leaders were able to take that approach because most of them were indeed democrats.
Suharto was a militarist with no convincing vision of a democratic future. The New Order's dictatorship contradicted all talk of Panca Sila democracy. Suharto used coercion by arms almost immediately any sign of a desire for independence surfaced.
And so it became inevitable that the popular commitment to the vision of a united Indonesia began to diminish in Aceh and West Papua. Acehnese and Papuan nationalism developed — these were not realities in 1945.
The New Order also weakened nation building everywhere. The essential engines of nation building since the 1920s have been the political parties and political movements. These parties and movements, representing different interests in society, were divided sharply by ideological outlook, from left to right. They fought and struggled hard. But they fought and struggled hard about the future of Indonesia, about their vision of how an independent Indonesian nation and state should develop.
They involved tens of millions of people in this great battle for the future of Indonesia. It may have been a bitter struggle but it was based on participation and commitment and a passion about the future of the new country.
Suharto destroyed the political parties, by crushing the left-wing parties and by the “simplification” of the centre and right-wing parties. All the old parties of the 1950s, except for the left, have resurfaced in one form or another but they are all bankrupt of ideological commitment.
They are infected with all the diseases of the New Order: self-seeking and only looking for the immediate gain. Only the genuinely new formations, like the Peoples Democratic Party and some worker, peasant, student and women's organisations are free of the New Order political culture.
There are no more vehicles that provide for genuine mass participation in determining the future. The economic crisis means that Indonesia's very future is being redefined. But the masses' commitment to “Indonesia” has weakened, hence the many demands for special treatment for provinces and regencies. Autonomy has become an excuse for localism. The political elite, created by the New Order, cannot solve this problem.
Unity still necessary
The peoples of the archipelago decided to unite in the 1920s to build a new nation and state as an answer to colonialism. The cry, “From Sabang to Merauke”, was a cry for unity against marauding and oppressive Western colonialism.
Marauding and oppressive Western colonialism is still here. Now it is not the Dutch, but the United States, the IMF and the “war against terror”.
The IMF now wages economic war against the Indonesian people in the interests of US and Western businesses greedy for cheap assets and minerals and access to the Indonesian mass market.
Unity from “Sabang to Merauke” is still needed. But, as in the 1920s, it cannot be achieved by force but only voluntarily. Today, there are also new realities: Acehnese nationalism and Papuan nationalism.
A democratic approach cannot avoid the holding of self-determination referendums. Of course, this carries the risk that the Acehnese and Papuan peoples may choose independence — a decision which must be accepted.
But this does not mean that the struggle for voluntary unity must stop. There can be many forms of unity: federation, confederation, even alliances between independent states. Perhaps in Aceh, agreement could be reached for a second referendum in 10 years' time to confirm whatever decision the people made after experiencing their new reality.
But the strongest and most effective unity that can help the people in their fight for sovereignty against the IMF marauders is one based on a voluntary acceptance and commitment to both the idea of unity itself and the form of that unity. Unity can only be achieved if all forms of coercion stop.
***
Papua and structural violence
Jakarta Post - April 13, 2006
Max Lane, Sydney – The arrival of 43 Papuan refugees in Australia followed soon after by the violent dispersal of otherwise peaceful student demonstrations in Papua has resulted in two weeks of sustained media coverage of the situation in Papua and its implications for Australia.
The demonstrations in Papua were organized by a coalition of student and activists groups, the most significant of which are the Parliament of the Streets of West Papua (Parjal), the Papuan Students Association (AMP) and the Papuan National Students Front (FMNP).
The demonstrations were demanding the closure of Freeport and a full audit of the ecological and human rights impact of the huge foreign owned mine as well as an assessment of its actual contribution to economic welfare in Papua.
After a peaceful day of demonstrations outside the University of Cendrawasih on March 15 and a peaceful morning of demonstrating on March 16, the police, and then later reinforced my army units, attacked the students.
There was fighting on the campus and 5 police were killed and almost 30 students wounded, including some shot. Another demonstration took place in the town of Timika with more injuries. Since then there has been a police hunt for student activists. Many are still in hiding.
During these demonstrations and in many statements since then, several very clear demands have emerged from these student and community groups.
First, there is the demand for the closure and full audit of Freeport. Second, there is a demand for all Indonesian Armed Forces to withdraw from Papua. Third, there is a demand for a democratic, free and open national and international dialog, involving Papuans, the Indonesians and the "international community". The Papuan groups calling for this dialog are asking for an international presence pointing to the big role foreign interests already play in Papua, through the Freeport mine.
The call for a democratic national and international dialog to discuss how to resolve the Papuan issue represents also a call for the end of repression of Papuans, or anybody else in Papua or Indonesia, who do call for secession.
There can be no democratic dialog without the full range of opinion being able to participate, including from the 35-45 percent of the people in Papua who are not indigenous Papuans.
Clearly this democracy will be impossible while the army remains a significant presence in Papua, with its own agenda. Since it has been forced into the background, first in Indonesia as a whole after the fall of Soeharto, and then more recently in Aceh, Papua remains its last remaining "sphere of influence".
This demand for a free, open dialog should be supported even though it goes further than some of the calls from more moderate sections of Papuan society who are concentrating on trying to get a renegotiation with Jakarta on the Special Autonomy Law, an end to Jakarta's efforts to divide Papua into three provinces and more economic benefits for Papua.
A democratic atmosphere free of all repression will be the best way to allow Papuans to debate out and form a clear vision of what they want and is a fundamental necessity for the conduct of the kind of dialog that they are demanding.
In relation to this, some recent announcements by the Australian government are totally counter-productive. The majority of Indonesian and Papuan opinion has consistently identified the enemy of democracy in Papua and as the "security approach".
This is the attempt to try to control and resolve political issues through the use of the security apparatus – the police and army. Australian Minister of Defense, Brendon Nelson's suggestion of joint naval patrols and PM John Howard's suggestion that refugee visa processes be revised for Papuan refugees both reinforce this "security approach" strengthening military and bureaucratic control rather than democratic political struggle.
If Papuans try to come to Australia by boat, it will be above all a political statement they are making about the lack of freedom in Papua. Capturing them with naval patrol boats when they are simply using their right to leave their country just compounds this lack of freedom.
Of course, nobody can predict absolutely what the outcome of dialog between Papuans, Indonesians and international representatives will be if carried out in genuine free and democratic atmosphere. Whatever path it leads to: An autonomous province, self-government within Indonesia, some other similar formula, or a referendum and independence, the fundamentally decisive factor will be the opinions of the people for whom Papua is home.