Max Lane will be speaking at the following events.

SINGAPORE, (late June, dates tbc): Book launch of UNFINISHED NATION: Indonesia before after Suharto (Verso, 2008)

JAKARTA, July 13: Public Celebration 80th birthday of Joesoef Isak. Full list of speakers will be posted soon.

JAKARTA, July 15: Public Forum on the occaison of Joesoef Isak's 80th Birthday. Full list of speakers will be posted soon.

SYDNEY, July 24-25, Conference "Literature and History" organised by the Australiasian Literature Association, to beheld at Macquarie University.

For recent events click "more" below

May 22, Tirto Adhisuryo and the ideological heritage of the Indonesian national revolution, Public Conference on the occasion f 100 years of Natioal Awakening, Association of Medical History, Jakarta

April 30, Nationalism or national liberation: comparative lessons from Venezuela and Indonesia, Public Lecture, University of Padjadaran, Bandung

April 29, anniversary of death of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's death - Public Forum, Unfinished Revolution: Pramoedya Ananta Toer's Political Essays and Speeches, Bandung

April 28: Seminar discussion: Bangsa Yang Belum Selesai: questions and answers with the author, Nalar Jatinangor, Bandung

April 24, "Menuju Keadilan Seutuhnya bagi rakyat Indonesia: Membaca kembali cita-cita bangsa Indonesia", Jakarta, organised by Perhimpunan Rakyat Pekerja at LBH: speakers: Mugiyanto, IKOHI; Irwansyah, PRP; Faisal Basri, University of Indonesia (TBC); Max Lane

April 23, Film screening, NOT FOR SALE, produced by Public Services International dan Media Nusa Communication, 2008, director, Wilson bin Nurtias; speakers: A. Daryoko (Chairperson, State Electricty Company Union - SP PLN); Max Lane; Khamid Istakhori (Secretary General Congress of Indonesian Trade Union Alliances - KASBI); Qorihani (Society for Defence of Public Services)

April 6: Indonesia's Economic Crisis: socialism as a solution, regular discussion series, Working Peoples Association, Jakarta

*NEW* NOVEMBER 24, 8pm "Pramoedya. the Novel, History and Liberation Politics", Public Forum, Kuala Lumpur, organised by GERAKBUDAYA. Speakers: Max Lane, and Dr Sumit Mandal, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Venue: Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, No 1, Jalan Maharajalela, Kuala Lumpur

November 24 *KUALA LUMPUR book launch of AROK OF JAVA, by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, translated and with Introduction by Max Lane, SILVERFISH Bookshop Kuala Lumpur. (Caste society, conspiracy and democracy: the contemporary relevance of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's AROK OF JAVA)

* NEW NEW * November 14, 2pm "Understanding the basis of feudal cultural remnants: Pramoedya's AROK DEDES", organised by Institut Nalar Jatinangor, venue: PSBJ Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung

*NEW* November 13 CULTURAL ORATION: On Extending Political Mobilisation to include Cultural Mobilisation: an Urgent Task Today, Institute for Global Justice, Public Gallery, Jakarta. (time tbc)
October 27, UPDATE, book launch of AROK OF JAVA by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, translated and with Introduction by Max Lane, Java Books Jakarta. Periplus Bookshop Kemang cordially invites you to join us in a celebration for the publication of Toer's latest English language publication. Time : 11 am – onwards Venue : Komp. Villa Kemang (Hero Kemang), Jl. Kemang Selatan 1 – South Jakarta

October 5, book launch of AROK OF JAVA, by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, translated and with Introduction by Max Lane, Kinokuniya Bookshop, Jakarta. Other speakers Danial Indrakusuma, Rieke Diah Pitaloka.

September (tbc) book launch of AROK OF JAVA, by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, translated and with Introduction by Max Lane, Kuala Lumpur.

September 20, “Will Indonesia reject Neo-liberalism: globalization and new nationalisms”, Asia Research Centre, National University of Singapore.

September 11, Dialogue with Max Lane and book launch of AROK OF JAVA, by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, translated and with Introduction by Max Lane, NATIONAL LIBRARY ODF SINGAPORE, organized by National University of Singapore.

September 6, “Pramoedya Ananta Toer and the Indonesian Nation: neither Malay nor Javanese”, Departmemt of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore.

August 30, “Seeking Indonesia” seminar at Indonesian Academy of the Sciences, panelist speaker (‘National Liberation., yes! Nation alism, No!”), other speakers included Dr Riwanto Tirtosudarmo.

August 26, "Self-reliant my nation - sovereign my country" organised as part of the 5th Congress of the Indonesian Buddhist Students Association. Other speakers were Franz Magnis-Suseno from the Driyarkara Higher Institute of Philosophy Jakarta, the economist Sri-Edi Swasono, and the labour activist Dita Indah Sari.

August 19, “The concept of revolution as a tool for understanding history”, traning seminar for journalists, PANTAU, Jakarta.

July 6,: “Nation and class in Indonesian society” organized by National Student League for Democracy (LMND), Centre for Southeast Asian Social Studies, Gajah Mada Univeresity; Centre for Panca Sila Studies, Gajah Mada University.

July 3-5, “Alternative History”, speaker at 3 day seminar organized by Centre for Southeast Asian Social Studies, Gajah Mada University and Australian research Council.

July 1, 2007 “Unfinished Nation: book review discussion”, Book Discount
Festival in the Auditorium Building A at the National Education Department in South Jakarta. Panelist speaker: other speakers Dr Danial Dhakidae, Dita Sari.

June 19, 2007: “Is it time for young leaders to come to power”, organized by Activists Talking Email List at Hotel Sahid Jaya. Panelist speaker.

Semsar, who also studied Marxist ideas while in Australia in the early 1990s, was an integral part of the anti-dictatorship and pro-people movement of the 1990s, often the victim of direct violence. He was a personality sensitive to the ugliness of capitalism and the pain suffered by the people. His paintings are infused with pain and they invert the ugliness and shattered ugliness of capitalist reality into a seering, moving kind of beauty. He absorbed that pain into himself too which shows through into his self-portratits, I think. See the example below.

A self-portrait

Below is one of Semsar's later paintings where he moves to floral colours. Still the pain shows.

Below is an example of one of Semsar's earlier black and white works entitled, "Head", taken from Edi Cahyono's Semsar Gallery website.

For some more examples of Semsar's earlier black and white work see the example's on Edi Cahyono's Semsar Gallery site, such as burjuisi or buruh bangunan("construction worker)" or Perkawinan (Marriage)

For more on Semsar see INSIDE INDONESIA, also see a second INSIDE INDONESIA article

A part of the dismantling of the welfare state has involved the slashing of budget for staffing and research at universities. It has also seen the introduction of student fees and government enforcement of a policy to make universities also generate somC of their own income through commercially profitable activities.

Ideologically, even in the early 1980s, the pressure was on for all sections of the universities to prove their usefulness to the political, economic, social and cultural agenda set within the framework of economic rationalism and the dismantling of the welfare state. In the field of Asian Studies, there was much talk of presenting Asian Studies as something useful to the private sector. Universities almost competed to set up research centres that depicted themselves as being useful to understanding the region in the context of the needs of the private sector. A result of this more-or-less systematic accommodation of a philosophical or strategic orientation set by the government’s new agenda has been the decline in government resources being made available to Asian Studies in universities.

The record of Western business in Asia is that it generally rides roughshod over cultural, political and environmental sensitivities, especially at the mass level. It is even dubious that academic economic studies of Asia are seen as particularly relevant for business, except perhaps to provide ideological cover for economic strategies that Australian and other Western governments prefer to see carried out in countries like Indonesia. This has been the major role, for example, of the Indonesia Project at the Australian National University, partly funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. Banks, credit rating organisations, and the research departments of big companies do this work using combined teams of local and foreign economists, rather than using any large-scale mobilisation of Asian Studies trained personnel.

Second, a thriving Asian Studies goes hand in hand with a thriving and critical liberal humanities. A critical liberal humanities sector would espouse and advocate values, ideas and critiques directly inimical to the political and social philosophy that goes hand in hand with economic rationalism and neo-liberalism. The extension and deepening of neo-liberalism throughout most of the Asian region is a policy fully and enthusiastically supported by the Australian government. These policies are, however, causing more and more socio-economic suffering and cultural disruption for the mass of the populations of countries such as Indonesia. Surely this situation would attract greater criticism from within a thriving and critical humanities sector with expert knowledge of the situation in these countries? There would, at least, be an energetic debate around these policies.

Critiquing the Australian state

Those involved in some way in Asian Studies constantly engage in debates about the nature of the state in countries like Indonesia. We analyse and draw conclusions about the kinds of policies that such a state will likely implement. We can apply the same approach to the Australian state. We should be aware of its character and agenda. We should be aware that it has seriously thought about its needs in this sector, and has drawn the conclusion that it does not need a critical liberal humanities milieu, nor a critical public and independent media.

The same applies in the area of security. It does not serve education interests to be appealing to the government to fund Asian Studies using the argument that Australia’s security is bound up with Indonesia. First, it turns the issue upside down. Many more Indonesians do and will continue to suffer because of the so-called security and economic ‘imperatives’ enforced on Indonesia to maintain western hegemony. This is evidenced in the political encouragement by governments such as Australia for the strengthening of the role of Indonesia’s Army.

We can be sure that the Australian state is taking these issues seriously. It will make a serious assessment of the resources it needs to understand the ‘security threat’ to its specific interests. This may lead to more staff and resources for Australian Defence Force Academy, a revival of Point Cook style language training for military officers, more interchange between Australian, American and Indonesian intelligence institutions, and so on.

Given the fact that the threats of ‘terror’ are actually used by the government to foster racism and xenophobia, an understanding of the root causes of the turmoil that gives birth to such irrationality as suicide bombing is also not in the government’s interest. This is particularly pertinent given that it is government policies (or the policies of the governments it supports) that are themselves the root cause.

Building a support base

Asian Studies is not at all dead — yet. In the face of cutbacks and an illiberal attitude towards the humanities, Asianist academics have been able to hold on, and even implement some very good initiatives. This positive activity has produced critics and opponents of Australian policy towards Asia. This is not at all useful for the implementation of the Australian states’ agenda. Does the Australian state really want more articles in the press by more people like Damien Kingsbury, Ed Aspinall and others? Does it want to see not only Max Lane write in the Jakarta media raising issues with a critical slant on Aceh, but also Tony Reid as well?

One very positive initiative by Australian Indonesianist academics has been Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies (ACICIS), which has expanded the number of Australian students who have really engaged in Indonesia. This has, in turn, supplied most of the younger generation of liberal critics of government policy, who now write in magazines such as Inside Indonesia. A stronger, more critical Inside Indonesia, and more such journals on a range of different subjects, is not in the interests of the Australian state.

A flourishing critical liberal humanities and Asian Studies are against the interests of the Australian state. The Australian state, through respective governments, understands this and will not be fooled on this question. Does this mean then that there is no hope of getting more funding for Asian Studies or the humanities? It does not mean this. But it does mean that strategies to win increased funding must be based on the realisation that the task is to force the government to do something that it knows is against it interests. Such a strategy requires convincing other sectors of society that a critical liberal humanities and Asian Studies is necessary in order to ensure that a broader coalition of groups support and join demands for more resources.

This kind of strategy means finding ways to prove that knowledge of another culture and society can be intrinsically enriching. Exposure to film, and the translation of literature for a wider audience is important. General books about politics and society are also crucial. But this will never be enough in itself to develop public commitment to a critical liberal humanities in an era where official state policy is illiberal in so many aspects: the abandonment of just livelihood and welfare, and agitation for increased racism and xenophobia.

Active support for a critical liberal humanities sector will come from those in society who are already questioning and struggling to understand this illiberalism. They are questioning why conditions in the developing world keep declining, instead of reaching the alleged existing ‘take-off’ point. They are questioning the turmoil, the war, the poverty, the refugees, the bombs — what does it all mean, and what are the solutions?

If we want support from the community, starting with those who are already questioning and likely to become active citizens, then we have to show we are useful to them, both in curriculum but also in the public arena, especially in publications.

The Australian state has no interest in seeing a strong, liberal, critical and humane Asian Studies. However, there is a community support base, if we can show we are more useful than perhaps we have been able to do in the past.

First published in INSIDE INDONESIA see Source: http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/262/29/

*************
EXCERPT from "Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Racialism and Socialism".

In the 1960s, Indonesian politics was characterised by a deep and fundamental battle around the question: what kind of country should independent Indonesia become? Political integration of the Chinese Indonesians was viewed by Toer, and by a large number of Chinese Indonesian leaders, as something that would be achieved by Chinese Indonesians, like all Indonesians, joining the struggle to finishing the Indonesian national revolution and consolidating Indonesian socialism. The largest active Chinese Indonesian organisation during the sixties was BAPERKI (Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan
Indonesia – Consultative Body of Indonesian Citizens) which adopted this perspective. It was banned and its leaders also arrested in 1965, at the same time as Toer and hundreds of thousands of others.

For Toer, moving in a socialist direction was a crucial part of the solution to discrimination against the Chinese as well as the framework that could facilitate full integration. He repeatedly illustrates how the whole history of discrimination against and oppression of the Chinese has been driven by the dynamics of competition among sections of capital, imperial as well as domestic. The Dutch, he explains, afraid that there were more Chinese active in trade compared to the initial tiny number of Dutch were the first to act against them, even to the extent of carrying out horrific massacres. All the early regulations, taking away Chinese subjects rights to live and work where they wish were instituted by the Dutch.

Evolving in an atmosphere where Dutch policy had ghettoised the, later tensions between Chinese and non-Chinese inhabitants of the ‘Indies” were, argues Toer, initially stimulated by Dutch manipulation and, then further developed as a result of rivalry with non-Chinese aspiring capitalists. He attacks mercilessly the commercial motives of such aspiring business people behind the 1959 regulations against which the book is aimed.

Toer’s point here is that the origins of anti-Chinese race hatred cannot be traced back to any inherent problems between Chinese and non-Chinese workers and peasants, even if, by the 1960s, anti-Chinese racial stereotyping had gained some influence among sections of the masses.

Under the New Order Suharto dictatorship, this dynamic remained, but was given some new twists. First, the relationship between the country’s top capitalists, namely the Suharto family and other military or politician families, foreign business and the largest Chinese Indonesian capitalists was increasingly characterised by partnership rather than rivalry. However, the Chinese cukong businessmen, alongside but often more easily appearing alien than the cronies generally, did emerge as a symbol of the blockage that the huge capital of the crony conglomerates represented to the thousands, even tens of thousands, of aspiring medium and small business people that emerged in Indonesia’s oil revenue fuelled business world.

Thus, as soon as the economy went into severe crisis in 1997, many political figures, many of whom had previously been in partnership with Chinese Indonesian businessmen, started to scapegoat them, often using the issue of capital flight. There was a massive campaign from within the Indonesian political and military elite to blame the Chinese for the economic crisis. Then when the crony conglomerates were dislodged from their position of dictatorial political power in May 1998, there were attempts to revive campaigns to dislodge Chinese Indonesian businesses at all levels. There was one attempt to start such a campaign during the Habibie presidency (1998-99) by Minister for Cooperatives and Small Business, Adi Sasono, when he began promoting the government “cooperatives” as an alternative distribution system. This echoed almost exactly the propaganda that Toer was answering in 1959 and 1960, even the same claim that there was no specific targeting of Chinese.

Even as late as August 2003, there was an attempt to include a reference for preferential treatment to “native business” in a key Economic Recovery Decree being considered by the Peoples Consultative Assembly. Public opposition, generated initially by the democratic agenda advocacy groups, eventually forced the deletion of this reference.

In the post-Suharto period, one result of the long period of partnership between Chinese Indonesian business cronies and the Suharto family and other leading non-Chinese business groups, is that the word cukong, as a symbol of big business wealth and accumulation, has been over-taken by that of kroni itself. Tensions between smaller business and “Chinese” business became increasing conflated with anti-kroni and anti-konglomerat sentiment in general. Of course, when Toer wrote his book the massive business conglomerates built by Soeharto’s family did not exist.

Nation-building, Indonesian socialism and double alienation

The other phenomena which ended in 1965 upon the seizure of power by the Suharto clique and its dictatorship was the central position occupied by the battle over what kind of country Indonesia should become. The violent suppression of the country’s largest political organisations, involving at least 20 million active members, who had been campaigning under the banner of “socialism ala Indonesia”, had “resolved” this issue – at least for the time being. From the point of view of the analysis presented by Toer, this would have also taken away the framework in which a real integration of the Chinese Indonesians could have been achieved.

If there was to be no struggle for a socialist Indonesia but rather simply an Indonesia driven by a “liberal economy’ where self-enrichment by whatever means available was the engine for all economic activity – as it was under Suharto, then there was no possibility of an integration based on joining with under inhabitants of Indonesia in the struggle to build the nation through a collective, conscious socialist effort.

For Toer, Chinese Indonesians were indeed Indonesians, who happened to have their own specific traditions and culture. He saw no reason for them to give up these traditions simply to become Indonesian. He was a nationalist, but not an assimilationist nationalist. For Toer, the Indonesian nation was still being created, as was its culture. In terms of national culture, Toer was – and still is - in fact an internationalist, taking the best, most progressive and democratic ideas from wherever they had originated – as is the essence of the second book, Child of All Nations, of his series of four books on the on the awakening of Indonesia, beginning with This Earth of Mankind. For Toer, Indonesia was ‘the earth of mankind’ not of some single race, and its ideas were to be drawn from the struggles of all nations. There was no Indonesian culture into which the Chinese Indonesians could assimilate. There was rather an Indonesian culture to be created. In this latter struggle, perhaps traditions and cultures might need to be abandoned, but the same applied to other traditions as well, especially that of the Javanese.

Under the Suharto dictatorship, however, Chinese Indonesian’s rights to express their traditions and cultures were suppressed. The Suharto dictatorship brought in policies explicitly banning Chinese traditional cultural practices from occurring in public. Chinese language schools were suppressed as was the use of the Chinese language in the media. The pressure for Chinese Indonesians to change their name to an “Indonesian” name was increased. This pressure had been around before 1965 but had been contained by public statements by President Soekarno who often raised the question – which Toer would have also asked – what is an Indonesian name? In a speech at the main Jakarta sports stadium in 1963 at a rally organised by BAPERKI, Soekarno expressed his view on this issue with the following words.

But my personal feelings, my brothers and sisters, is that I don’t recognise difference in blood. The same for names. For example my own name, Sukarno, is it an original Indonesian name? No! It comes from Sanskrit, “sukarna”. Ah, over there Abdulgani, Arab; yes brother Roeslan has an Arab name. And then there is Pak Ali, his name is mixed. Ali is Arab, Sastramidjaaja is from Sanskrit. … If you want to be an Indonesian, there is no need to change your name. You want to keep Thiam Nio as your name, fine, why not. … Why do people demand that Chinese Indonesians change their name if they want to become a citizen of the republic of Indonesia. … No! This is a private matter. …”

Chinese Indonesians were subject to a double oppression under Suharto. They were banned from freely practicing their traditions while, along with the rest of the mass of the population, they were disenfranchised from meaningful political participation, namely, in the political struggle to shape Indonesian society.

(excerpt only)

FPN demo May 29 - presidential palace in the background.

More photos FPN action May 29 - 2nd Jakarta aksi Photos by Admo

For some translations of Jakarta news reports of this action, click HERE - and scroll down to Latest from INDOLEFT.

May 21 aksi photo

Standing on the left: FNP and KPRM-PRD activist, Danial Indrakusuma.

JAKARTA - main action over; some protesters attending open air cultural event organised by Indonesian Street Buskers Union (SPI-PRM)

GOVERNMENT says 28% increase in fuel pirces is definitely on.

Immediately above is the lead banner of the FPN rally:

Reads:
DEFEAT THE FUEL PRICE INCREASE!
TAKE OVER OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY UNDER THE PEOPLES CONTROL!
CAPITALISTS, POLITICAL ELITE AND PARTY DECEIVERS OF THE PEOPLE,
STEP ASIDE! ITS TIME FOR THE PEOPLE TO WIELD POWER!

On the Left: Come on! Unite!
National Liberation Front!

I have about 60 photos (taken by Faiza Mardzoeki). Click here for some. Titles and so on later. People who are mostly in red are with the FPN. Those with blue, yellow etc flags and banners are with the FPR.

National Liberation Front Statement - May 13, 2008

The battle drum of the Indonesian people’s
resistance to the planned fuel price increases has
been sounded -- students, the urban poor, workers,
farmers and women in every corner of the country are
daily holding actions that are growing and uniting
day by day. This indicates that the people’s
standard of living has declined to an intolerable
level and that the Indonesian people are not
prepared to accept the government’s plan to increase
fuel prices by 30 percent.

What they never explain however is that why
international fuel prices are tending to rise? And
why must domestic fuel prices follow international
fuel prices?

The reasons for the rise in world fuel prices:

1. The reason that is most often reported is the
decline in supply from oil producing countries,
either because of upheavals (such as Iraq or
Nigeria), the decline in oil reserves (such as
Indonesia) or because the governments and people in
particular countries are in the process of
nationalising international oil companies (as is
occurring in Venezuela), while energy demand
continues to increase, both in the imperialist
countries (the US requires 20.59 million barrels per
day, Japan 5.22 million barrel per day and Russia
3.10 million barrels per day) as well as in
countries where there is rapid economic growth (such
as India which requires 2.53 million barrels per day
and China at 7.27 million barrels per day), even
though there is no evidence to indicated that the
world’s oil industries are unable to meet this
demand.

2. The real reason -- and this is rarely reported on
-- is oil speculation on international share
markets. As is the case with other shares, oil share
traders are extremely vulnerable to speculation, and
it is this that is in fact triggering the increases
in international fuel prices.

The real reasons for increasing Indonesian fuel
prices:

1. The price of fuel in Indonesia always follows
world prices because the majority of oil and gas
companies in Indonesia are controlled by foreign
capital (the owners of national oil industries) so
that oil produced by Indonesia is prioritised for
sale in international markets, and even if it has to
be sold in Indonesia, then its price is the same as
the international price of fuel (which they also
determine).

2. What is sold domestically is limited to only 15
percent of total production, and this is also why
the government has to buy fuel at international
prices, when in fact these foreign companies should
be obliged to supply this -- and it should not just
be 15 percent -- but more. After all, this is oil
taken from our own soil.

3. Indonesia does not have the industrial capacity
to refine crude oil into fuel, so the fuel that we
use on a daily basis must be purchased from other
countries. Put simply, we have large reserves of
crude oil (although it is controlled by foreigners,
only a small percentage is controlled by the state-
owned oil company Pertamina) that is taken overseas
to be processed, they we buy it back at the
international price. This is why the price of
domestic fuel always follows international prices.

4. What adds further to these high prices is that
the purchase and sale of this oil is done through
brokers, so it is even more expensive again when it
is sold back to the people. The profit on the
importation of a barrel of oil is as much as 30
percent, so with our total imports reaching 113
million barrel per year, the brokers’ profit is
US$170 million or 1.6 trillion rupiah. While for
exported oil the brokers’ profit is US$2 per barrel.
So with a daily export of 490,000 barrels, the money
going into the brokers’ pockets is 9.3 billion
rupiah per day or 3.3 trillion rupiah per year.

5. Worse still, all of the costs born by these
foreign companies in drilling for crude oil (from
the initial survey to production) are fully (100
percent, moreover it has now reached 120 percent
because there is an additional 20 percent for
companies that develop oil wells that have
previously been processed) paid for by the
government (with of course the people’s money, which
comes from taxes and so forth), which is usually
referred to as “cost recovery”.

Conclusion:

1. So even though the Indonesian nation has at least
329 blocks or sources of oil and gas covering an
area of 95 million hectares (half of Indonesia’s
land area) with estimated oil reserves of as much as
250-300 billion barrels (equivalent to Saudi Arabia
which is currently the largest oil producer in the
world) with total daily crude oil production
reaching 1 million barrel or 159 million litres per
day, it does not benefit the people of Indonesia.

2. With the capacity to produce 1 million barrels of
crude oil per day, at the current price of US$120
per barrel this translates into 1.104 trillion
rupiah per day or 397.44 trillion per year. This
does not yet include the value of gas sales, which
are enormous, reaching 82.8 trillion rupiah per
year. If all of the oil industries were controlled
by a pro-people state, then there would be no state
budget deficit as a result of the increase in world
fuel prices (the budget deficit of 21.4 trillion
rupiah is well below the profit of 397.44 trillion
from oil and 82.8 trillion from gas).

3. Not to mention the fact that the state does not
have to spend such excessive amounts on cost
recovery. As of mid-2007 alone, the government spent
93.9 trillion rupiah on cost recovery.

4. The benefits for the people would increase if
Indonesia could process its own crude oil, without
having to send it overseas for processing, and then
buy it back again. Just imagine, 4.9 trillion rupiah
per year is wasted on brokers (export and import).

5. Now compare this with the direct cash assistance
(BLT) for the poor which only amounts to 14 trillion
over six months for millions of people, which in
real terms translates into only 100,000 rupiah a
month or 3,000 rupiah per day for each of these
millions of people. If domestic fuel prices are
increased, this will not even be enough to
compensate for increases to public transport costs.

Why is the Indonesian nation, which is rich and
large, colonised by foreign capital?

1. Because all of the political forces in Indonesia
(the parties of Suharto’s New Order regime, the
military, the fake reform parties, the fake
nationalist parties and the parties that act in the
name of religion but leave their religious
communities to be colonised) are cowards in the face
of international capital, who have moreover by
acclamation supported the enactment of laws and
regulations that allow international capital to
plunder Indonesia’s natural wealth including our oil
(the latest being the law on capital investment and
its derivatives) and to exploit our labour. Although
the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P),
the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Justice and
Prosperity Party (PKS) or the speaker of the House
of Representatives who is from the Golkar Party are
currently opposing the fuel price increases, this is
only as a means to boost their popularity in the
upcoming 2009 general elections. This is also the
case with the old political elite figures that are
now on the political margins, which are busy
proclaiming their opposition. There are none who are
actually prepared to oppose the colonisation by
foreign capital like Fidel Castro in Cuba, Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Maorales in Bolivia or
Indonesia’s founding President Sukarno in Indonesia.

2. Because the intellectuals (economic and political
observers, university rectors and lecturers) are
also cowards. Moreover there are many who are even
prepared to be paid by international capital, the
government or by other means to support these
colonialist programs (by providing research funds,
scholarships, facilities and the like).

3. Domestic companies also have the same mentality
as the political elite, not resisting the domination
of international capital, but instead becoming the
agents of international capital. Even now
organisations such as the Indonesian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (Kadin) and the Indonesian
Employers Association (Apindo) are vehemently
supporting the fuel price increases.

4. The principle force that is capable of
confronting international capital -- the working
class and the poor -- have yet to demonstrate their
real strength in the form of nationwide
mobilisations and by uniting the movement
organisations.

The solution for the Indonesian people:

1. Take over all oil and gas and other vital
industries in Indonesia under the control of the
people;

2. Repudiate the foreign debt;

3. Cooperate with the governments and people of
Venezuela and Bolivia to develop refineries and the
oil industry;

4. Diversify energy sources in order to guarantee
environmental sustainability;

5. Push aside the capitalist class, the elite and
the political parties that deceive the people, build
the people’s own power.

Short-term solutions:

1. Cancel the planned fuel price hikes and bring
down prices;

2. Seize the assets of former President Suharto and
his cronies and monies embezzled through the
Indonesian Bank Liquidity Support scheme;

3. Cut the wages of government officials at the
national to the sub-district level by 30 percent;

4. Cut the wages of executives at private companies
by 50 percent;

5. Place limits on private capital by means of
restricting the capital ownership, increasing tax on
private cars, increasing parking fees and so forth;

6. Apply a 35 percent tax on the profits from export
and import of oil.

A call to unite in opposition:

1. Hold daily mass actions, everywhere, by means of
factory strikes, road blocks, occupying government
offices and mass actions in the streets to thwart
the fuel price hikes;

2. Unite the student’s actions with the people’s
actions, make the campuses a place to consolidate
the people’s mass struggle;

3. Hold a nation wide action simultaneously on May
21 and June 1, besiege and occupy the centres of
power. In Jakarta, let’s besiege and occupy the
State Place;

4. Unite and build the people’s movement resisting
colonialism nationally as an embryo of a new
people’s government.

- Besiege and occupy the State Palace on May 21 and
June 1
- Thwart the planned fuel price hikes by uniting the
people’s mobilisations
- Take over the oil and gas industries by people’s
mobilisations under the control of the people
- Push aside the capitalist class, the political
elite and the political parties that deceive the
people. It is time for the people to take power

National Liberation Front
Jakarta, May 13, 2008

General Secretariat: Jl. Pori Raya No 06 RT009/RW
010
Pisangan Timur, Jakarta Timur
Phone/Fax: 021 4757881
Email: pembebasan.nasional@gmail.com

The National Liberation Front (Front Pembebasan
Nasional, FPN):

BPI, the Coalition of People Against Eviction
(PAWANG), the Coalition of the People Arising to
Resist (Korban), the Commission for Missing Persons
and Victims of Violence (Kontras), the Indonesia
Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI), the
Indonesian Association of the Families of Missing
Persons (Ikohi), the Indonesian Buskers Union (SPI),
the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi),
the Indonesian Student Secretariat (SMI), the
Institute for Public Research and Advocacy (Elsam),
the Institute of Global Justice (IGJ), the Jakarta
Legal Aid Foundation (LBH), JGM, JKB, the Agrarian
Reform Consortium (KPA), LPBH FAS, Movement
(Pergerakan), the National Transport Workers
Federation (FBTN), Free Women (Perempuan Mahardika),
the Politics for the Poor-Indonesian Student League
for Democracy (LMND-PRM), the Poor People's Alliance
(ARM), the Poor Peoples Political Union (PPRM),
Praxis, SIEKAP, SPEED, SPP, VHR, the Workers
Challenge Alliance (ABM), the Working People's
Association (PRP).

[Translated by James Balowski.INDOLEFT News Service]

JAKARTA: FPN contingent and FPR contingent remain separate. Crowds from different aksi, organised by different groups, responding to the May 21 call, unable to fuse. Each is organsing its own programme of speeches and so on. Have had no report on the names of all the different groups there: but have noticed, in reports: FPN, FPR, FORKOT, BEM Se-Indonesia (although website reports also say they have been demonstrating elsewhere at the parliament.) There were reprots that some FRM elements would also return to the Palace but I have not seen any reports.

JOGJAKARTA: 4 students from Sarekat Mahasiswa Indonesia (SMI) and one from one of the Jogja area BEMs arrested when they tried to get over the barbed wire barriers put arround the parliament building. (In Joga the demo is under the name ok Committee For the People Together (FRB), and is probably broader than FPN.)

SMS report: FPN contingents now united near palace, including unions State Electricity Company, airport unions, and shop workers union from CAREFOR supermarket chain. SMS reports estimate "around 6,000".

SMS report at 2.42pm

Reports of people running from Palace area. Not clear what is happening.
FOLLOW UP SMS: Appears a clash between activists from another group, FORKOT (Town Forum), mainly students, and police at Palace. Meanwhile the FPR marchers, who were approaching the Palace ahead of the FPN contingent mentioned earlier, have been blocked from proceeding further towards the palace.

SMS reports to 2.30pm

JAKARTA: FPN contingents and also Front Perjuangan Rakyat (FPR) closer to Palace. Marching separately. No numbers. FPN contingents still waiting for contingent for trade union covering workers in State Electricity Company (PLN).

JOGJA: After a brief unity with protesters from the PDIP and PAN parties (who must also be demonstrating), the FPN have continued an occupation of the State Building in Jogjakarta. SMS reports put about 2,500 in FPN contingents now gathering a few hundred metres from the Palace. Others, from various groups, already at the palace.

WEBSITE reports: a quick perusal of several Indonesian language news reports (usually very brief) indicate that protests have been very wide spread. Many groups, outside the two Left alliances (and the FRM alliance - , have organised their own actions, especially students.

1.15 SMS reports

BIMA: FPN demonstration in Bima violently dispersed. Nine people still detained. Around 20 injured. (KPRM SMS report).

JAKARTA: many contingents appear to be heading to directly converge at Presidential Palace: rather than at another point. Many contingents still on their way. Contingent leaving from GROGOL area of Jakarta stopped at Jl Juanda by security - now negotiatingg.

Detik.com reporting (in very brief reports) anti-fuel price rise demos by various different groups in several locations.
*****
TERNATE - SMS reports now say 20 activists detained.
JOGJAKARTA- about 1,000 activists now at Gedung Agung State building, guarded by security apparatus. No more SMS reports on FAKI.
JOGJAKARTA area: SMS coming in from different point: gatherings of 200-700 heading for central gathering points in Central Jakarta.
MEDAN: About 500 FPN heading for government buildings in Medan. SMS reports mention at least five other separate organisations.

GENERAL UPDATE NOTE: This morning’s papers carry reports of the heads of the youth wings of the Muhammidiyah and Nahdatul Ulama, the two largest religious socio-educational organizations have come out against the fuel price rises, as has Megawati and Amien Rais.

(The updates below are abbreviated translations of SMS text messages I have received from activists.)

Demands set out in leaflets:

“1. DEFEAT THE FUEL PRICE INCREASES

2. LOWER THE PRICES OF BASIC NEEDS GOODS

3. UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE, SEIZE THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY, MOSTLY OWNED BY FOREIGN INTERESTS AND CAPITALISTS

All this is only possible if all of the peoples’ strength unites in large scale mass mobilizations, builds peoples organizations, builds unifications of the people.”

++++

REPRESSION IN TERNATE (an eastern island provinve):

Demonstration underway outside DPRD. FPN activist Dede, a lecturer at the Muhammidiyah University in North Maluku was detained at the local military command, but released a while later after interrogation. The demonstration is continuing outside the local parliament. (10.30am approx Indonesian time)

At approx 10.40, however, according to SMS reports there was a provocation and the demonstration turned “chaos”. Several activists have been arrested including Haekal (Gamhas), alan, Kardi, Sumarlan and Ono.

JAKARTA REGION:

Groups of 200-700 people have been reported to be gathering in different spots around Jakarta organizing speak-outs and handing our leaflets since early morning. The aim has been to leave central Jakarta meeting points for a march to the Presidential palace around 11.00am. Most of the messages indicate these are groups gathering in the Tangerang-Bekasi area.

(Apart from FPN, detik.com news websites also reports that FRM, FPR and also the All Indonesia Student Executive Bodies (BEM seIndonesia) are also demonstrating at the Palace today.)

LUWUK, South Sulawesi - about 500 students, are lead by FPN, from university of UNTIKA and are heading to another campus, UNISMU, to seek solidarity there. The ,arch is being accompanied by hundreds of ojek bike riders. (Men who take passengers on their motor bikes.) The action is planned to continue into the late afternoon.

SEMARANG, (Central Java) – FPN Semarang has started a speak-out of around 50 people.(1000am Indo time).

At least 3,000 people mobilized on May 20 through the FRM (see NOTE below) to protest the proposed fuel price increases. (Update info: some website media reports yesterday, including KOMPAS TV, put the attendance as high as 8-10,000, although the May 21 KOMPAS says "hundreds". The daily SEPUTAR INDONESIA gives a figure of 2,000. From TV footage I would think 2-4,000 may be a possible figure. I still no real hard data on the size of the various components of this demo.)

The FRM leaflet distributed before the event had three demands:

1. Reject the increase in price increases
2. Lower the prices of basic consumer goods
3. Kick out the Neo-Liberal agents: Boediono, Sri Mulyana, Marie Elka Pangestu. Aburizal Bakrie and Purnomo Yusgiantoro. [All ministers in the cabinet dealing with economic issues.]

Comment:

The leaflet that was distributed, with the demands above, reflects the agenda of the elite based forces connected to these groups. There is no mention of the demand to nationalize the oil and gas industries, as taken up by the other alliances, as a key solution to solving the pressures on the mass of the people. (Although I did see a few banners with this demand among the rally.) The emphasis on dismissing particular cabinet ministers as a political solution probably also reflects the pressure of elite political forces eyeing these posts. The other alliances take a clear position that the elite as a whole has to “step aside” and make way for popular forces to wield power.

NOTE:

There are three alliances operating in Jakartaat the moment, formed in response to the government’s decision to increase fuel prices. These are:

National Liberation Front (FPN), a coalition of socialist political groups, trade unions, peasant groups, and progressive NGOs. (see http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/focus/maxlane_newleftactivistallianceformed_140508.htm AND http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/focus/fpn_resist&defeatthefuelpriceincreases_170508.htm)

Front Perjuangan Rakyat (FPR) – an alliance of national democratic sectoral organizations, some migrant worker groups and farmers groups. The ideological emphasis of this group relates to the fundamental importance of land-reform and peasant struggle. The farmer group, AGRA, is an important part of this coalition.

Peoples Demand Front (FRM) – an alliance of groups, coming out of the democracy movement, but operating in tandem or with some kind of connection with elite based political parties or formations. This group includes, REPDEM, working with Megawati’s PDIP; PAPERNAS, preparing to do electoral work with the half-Islamist, mostly opportunist Star Reformation Party and several other groups connected to elite elements. It also includes the Indonesian Framers Council (DTI), a recent split from the old Suharto regime’s peasant union.