The recent arrests in Indonesia of leaders of JI have caused the usual excitement amongst the Security-wallahs (the people who make a living out of telling governments how Islamic terrorists are making the sky fall). It is interesting to see the various internal and external discussions going on here.
On the one hand the arrests are very good, they show that the violent terrorist organisation usually known as JI is a lot weaker (relatively obscure people are having to fill some of the gaps in leadership), and the net is closing. On the other hand M Top is still at large and no doubt trying to get hold of bomb-making material, and there are still nutcases who want to sign up to support him in such activities.
Leaving aside the objective issues of closing down terrorist groups, the reporting on the story has elicited some fascinating responses. Some of those who want to run scare campaigns in the West, including Australian politicians, are still running the line that 'we cannot relax our vigilance'. The DFAT website still advises Australians not to go to Indonesia: 'We advise you to reconsider your need to travel to Indonesia, including Bali, at this time due to the very high threat of terrorist attack. We receive regular
targets, including places frequented by foreigners. If you are in Indonesia, including Bali, and are concerned for your safety you should consider departing. If you do decide to travel to Indonesia, including Bali, you should exercise extreme caution.' As I've commented before, when the US has shooting sprees, and the US and the UK issue major statements about terrorist activities in those countries, there are no similar warnings telling Australians not to visit New York or London. And the law-and-order campaigns continue, with for example the revelations in today's Sydney Morning Herald about NSW police attempting to get student leaders to spy on demonstrators. The absurdly-named 'War Against Terror' is a key part of the creation of such Stasi-like practices; some in the security world must feel disappointed every time a leading terrorist is captured. Did the US deliberately let Osama bin Laden get away in the earlier stages of the war in Afghanistan?
On the other hand, some of the Indonesian responses to the capture have been pretty depressing as well...
Some Indonesian commentators still refuse to believe any evidence about terrorism, seeing all anti-terrorist activities within the framework of a Western plot against them. Such reactions are the result of the censorship and political culture of the Suharto years, and the general cultivation of ignorance that keeps a small group of men in power.
In the Indonesian commentary there have been justifiable questions about why the police and BIN, the intelligence body, still do not work together. I think Gus Dur's abolition of the 'Department of Information' and of various bodies was a great move, and it's a pity to see them back in action, since, as the captures show, BIN is really surplus to requirements.
Still all-in-all there is progress, albeit slow. Now if only there could be similar progress in the Australian and Indonesian press presenting the relationship between the two countries in a positive light.
Comments
There are no assumptions in the above comments regarding Bakorinda; the apparatus is open source knowledge.
Maybe it wasn't expressed clearly, but BAIS don't operate within BIN, they work together.
SBY relaunched it in 2005, however, the apparatus works on a different level than D-88.
Posted by: naga | July 23, 2007 02:38 PM
Interesting comments Naga.
But where did you get the information about BAIS operating within the BIN structure? I've been following this issue for some years but have never found any reference to such a radical development. The vague and abortive efforts at streamlining the intelligence bureaucracy foundered despite much advocacy in that direction during GD's presidency. I don't believe your comment is 'open sourced knowledge' but rather an assumption circulated openly and accepted uncritically.
I think Adrian's points about BIN's redundancy are spot on, especially where alluding to the defunct Ministry of Information. I believe that some checks on substantial matters of structure, personnel and some past case detail should make it clear that BIN, like its predecessor BAKIN, is largely a front, though with some means and charter as a 'second opinion' where sought.
Anyway, these guys have a good laugh about foreign scrutiny regardless. One good example was BIN Chief Syamsir Siregar's smiling reply to SBS reporter O'Shea's questioning (in stammering, tripped-over Indonesian grammar): "You speak very good Indonesian!"
Posted by: Matt | July 10, 2007 03:32 PM
The recent 'spate' of arrests actually shows one how strong the JI group still is; it is larger than previously thought, with all 2007 arrests showing that certain cells still have mass inventory of weapons, ammunition and explosive materiel.
Very few people know that Indonesia does not have one counter-terrorist (CT) program, they actually have two. Parallel programs are being run by Polri (via Densus 88) and via BIN (called 'Bakorinda'), an over-arching 'intelligence gathering' apparatus that is actually conducted by teams comprised of BIN (civilian intelligence) and BAIS (military intelligence) officers (this is open sourced knowledge).
The Bakorinda team has arrested several men from extremist groups, 'de-briefed' them and sent them back to their groups to be used as agents (i.e. so as to be used as information conduits).
Thus, like any Indonesian government iniative (or Australian for that matter), the program is highly un-coordinated and the full extent of its success/failure is yet to be known. However, the Indonesians should be applauded for how they 'turn' former extremists into counsellors who 're-educate' former extremists upon arrest; they have been extremely innovative in their approach and the Americans could learn alot from them.
The problem for Indonesia's long term CT strategy is that the government is taking a purely law enforcement approach to the issue (even though it combines some community relations elements).
Due to President Yudhoyono's (SBY) reliance on several Islamist parties for the security of his coalition in parliament , he is relcutant to tackle the 'Arabisation' of Indonesia's local political apparatus (such as the increasing implementation of Sharia-like laws at provincial level); this has proven to be extremely unpopular amongst all Indonesians, who often feel helpless to fight it.
SBY is also reluctant to crack down on extremist pesantrans, which have turned out to be terrorist factories. It should be noted that legitimate pesantrans have often been a source of education for poorer Indonesian Muslims, there are only a tiny core of extremist-linked schools.
In addition, nobody wants to address the ugly and uncomfortable issue of the connections between legitimate Muslim-based political parties (such as the Prosperous Justice Party aka PKS) and Islamic extremist groups throughout the archipelago.
Posted by: naga | July 2, 2007 06:36 PM